Group Identities in Conflicts

authored by: Martin Kolmar, Andreas Wagener
Abstract: If the members of a group identify with their group, free-riding behavior within the group is reduced. This seems beneficial at first sight. However, in contests between groups, identification escalates conflicts, increasing rent dissipation and possibly generating welfare losses. Generally, in an inter-group conflict the adoption or non-adoption of a group identity is endogenous. We show that, if groups are similar in size and conflict technology, all groups will adopt a group identity, reducing welfare for all. If groups are unequal, the stronger one will develop a group identity, which goes at the expense of the weaker group. Out-group hostility favors asymmetric identities. Applications include team spirit in war and sports, national identities or (seemingly) dysfunctional behavior of social groups.
Organisation(s): Institute of Economic Policy
External Organisation(s): University of St. Gallen (HSG)
Type: Article
Journal: Homo Oeconomicus - Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics
Volume: 36
Pages: 165-192
No. of pages: 28
ISSN: 2366-6161
Publication date: 14.09.2019
Publication status: Published
Peer reviewed: Yes
Sustainable Development Goals: SDG 16 - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions
Electronic version(s): https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/48694/1/VfS_2011_pid_709.pdf (Access: Open)
https://doi.org/10.1007/s41412-019-00083-8 (Access: Closed)