The epistemic and moral dimensions of testimony in scientific research

authored by

George Kwasi Barimah

supervised by

Torsten Wilholt

Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the expert-layperson relationship. The central aim of the dissertation is to answer the question of how laypersons can acquire reliable scientific information which has implications for their life. For example, information concerning the safety of vaccines and the risks and benefits of clinical trials for research participants. In order to provide an answer to this question I analyze and synthesize themes in epistemology of testimony, social epistemology and philosophy of science which have bearings on this topic. This dissertation argues for sharing epistemic and moral burdens between experts and laypersons who stand in a communicative relationship, with experts bearing a greater share of the burden because of their privileged epistemic status. This dissertation makes a case for this view through four thematically connected articles (Chapters 2-5). Chapter one introduces the dissertation and provides an overview of the chapters. Chapter two examines the proposals by some social epistemologists that laypersons can determine which expert to trust by using second-order means. I challenge this view by unearthing the obstacles that second-order assessments present to laypersons. Based on these limitations, I propose that experts who make scientific claims and science journalists should facilitate laypersons’ second-order assessments. Chapter three considers the moral dimension of epistemic trust in experts by acknowledging the affective aspect of the trust relationship. I examine how philosophers working on testimony and trust have unpacked the moral aspects of trusting others for reliable information. Although there is a strong tendency to reject a moralized conception of trust when it comes to science, I resist this view by showing that epistemic trust in scientists by laypersons is a deeply moral issue because epistemic dependence on expert knowledge makes laypersons vulnerable in most cases. Chapter four defends the claim that experts who serve as testifiers can become victims of epistemic injustice. This chapter acknowledges the harms that laypersons can commit against experts when they perform wrong second-order and value assessments of experts. Chapter five considers scientific testimony at the level of scientific organizations. This chapter acknowledges that scientific testimony is also provided by collectives, and not just individual experts. I examine this phenomenon by focusing on Public Health Agencies (PHAs) and their interactions with the public. I argue that trust and not mere reliance is the appropriate attitude the public should have towards PHAs. I do this by building on the argument from inductive risk in science. I end this chapter by providing criteria for trustworthy PHAs. Chapter six concludes the dissertation.

Organisation(s)

Graduiertenkolleg 2073/1

Type

Doctoral thesis

No. of pages

117

Publication date

21.05.2024

Publication status

Published

Sustainable Development Goals

SDG 3 - Good Health and Well-being

Electronic version(s)

https://doi.org/10.15488/17385 (Access: Open)