Predictivism and old evidence
a critical look at climate model tuning
- authored by
- Mathias Frisch
- Abstract
Many climate scientists have made claims that may suggest that evidence used in tuning or calibrating a climate model cannot be used to evaluate the model. By contrast, the philosophers Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl have argued that, at least within the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, tuning is simply an instance of hypothesis testing. In this paper I argue for a weak predictivism and in support of a nuanced reading of climate scientists’ concerns about tuning: there are cases, model-tuning among them, in which predictive successes are more highly confirmatory of a model than accommodation of evidence.
- External Organisation(s)
-
University of Maryland
- Type
- Article
- Journal
- European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Volume
- 5
- Pages
- 171-190
- No. of pages
- 20
- ISSN
- 1879-4912
- Publication date
- 01.05.2015
- Publication status
- Published
- Peer reviewed
- Yes
- ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History and Philosophy of Science
- Sustainable Development Goals
- SDG 13 - Climate Action
- Electronic version(s)
-
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-015-0110-4 (Access:
Closed)
